In this paper, I analyze consumption, aggregate savings,output and welfare implications of …ve di¤erent social security arrangements whenever there is demographic uncertainty. Following Bohn (2002), I analyze the e¤ect of an uncertain population growth in an extended version of a modi…ed Life-cycle model developed by Gertler(1999) . Population growth dampens savings and output under all arrangements. Pay-as-you-go-De…ned Bene…t system appears to fare better than all other alternatives, falling short of the private annuity market with no pension system. But social security in general increases social welfare, with Fully Funded systems faring the best. Thus there appears to be a clear tradeo¤ between growth and social welfare. The social security system also reduces the volatility of the economy.
Introduction
In this paper,I analyzed consumption, aggregate savings, output behavior and also welfare under two popular social security arrangements when ever there is demographic uncertainty. The two popular social security arrangements are Pay as You Go(PAYGO) and Fully Funded(FF) social security. I analyze two variants of each of these social security systems, the De…ned Bene…t(DB) and the De…ned Contribution(DC) arrangements. Under the assumption of a …xed bene…t rate for the DB system and a …xed tax rate for the DC system, I analyze both short run and long run e¤ect of demographic uncertainty. I use a life-cycle model to carry out my analysis. In this setup, the population is divided into two groups, workers and retirees. These two groups are heterogenous in terms of their consumption and savings behavior. All the workers and all the retirees would be ex-ante identical. In the model there is uncertainty about retirement and death. I assume the transitional probability to retirement and death to be constant. In order to introduce short run variation, I introduce a stochastic population growth process for the workers. I consider a permanent increase in the growth rate of the worker population. Longrun analysis reveals contrasting e¤ect of alternative social security system on the consumption, capital accumulation and output. Social security arrangement appears to be in general bene…cial for the retiree, but harmful to the worker's consumption. Pension system also dampens output growth and discourages savings. PAYGO-DB appears to fare better than rest of the arrangements, although far worse than the private annuity market without social security or government intervention. This contrasts with the existing literature. In case of the population shock, it appears that Intergenerational risk sharing mechanism like the PAYGO systems provide better risk sharing. But when social welfare is considered, there appears to be clear trade-o¤ between growth and welfare. FF system appears to be welfare maximizing, even when compared with the non distortionary private annuity market. In fact the latter performs the worst in terms of welfare. I also look at speed of convergence of the economy and relate that to the volatility of the system. It appears that social security arrangements in general reduces the volatility of the economy.
Motivation and Literature Review
In this paper, my plan is to look at the e¤ect of a permanent shock in the growth rate of the work force on the economy under alternative social security systems using a new kind of lifecycle model. Figure 1 -5 highlights some of the demographic features and trends in employment in USA. There are several interesting things in the that. First, although population growth has slowed down after the 70's, with unemployment rate at its lowest and with a rapid increasing rate of immigration fueled by positive signal from the policy makers, USA has been experiencing a large in ‡ux of fresh and returning entrant into the labor force. An increased immigration to the USA and similar increase in the number of naturalization of aliens de…nitely have contributed to the improved performance of employment scenario over the changes in the labor force. This is projected to remain at a higher level. Hence analyzing the e¤ect of an increases in the growth rate of workforce force may be a useful exercise. The second motivation comes from the changes in the nature of retirement in USA. Using HRS data, Quinn(1999) estimates that between one-third and one -half of older Americans take on Bridge Jobs(temporary, sometimes lower paid jobs) before exiting labor force completely. He concludes that retirement pattern in America are much richer and more varied than the stereotypical one-step view of retirement suggests. Maestas(2004) …nds that more than one-third of retirees in their 50's go back to work after retirement. Using a larger panel data set from the HRS survey, Cahill, Giandrea and Quinn(2005) …nds that ( Table  1 in appendix) in 1992, 15% of all the employed worker since age 49 had part time employment. In 2002, in the same population(now ten years older), 25% of all employed men had part time jobs. In 2000, this fraction was even larger, 33%. We also see similar picture for female. Table-2 reveals some more dramatic results. Out of the men who had full time job in 1992, 40% of them in 2002 who then over 60 years of age had part time job. Out of the people who were 65 years and older(full retirement age in traditional sense) 37.5 % had part time job. Two important conclusions arise from their …ndings. First, retirees should no longer be modeled as withdrawing completely from the labor force. Second, it is safe to assume that the part time jobs that traditional retirees get after their retirement pays them a lower e¤ective wage.
In the literature, life-cycle models are popular for analyzing demographic transition. Ever since the development of the life-cycle models by Brumberg, Ando, Modigliani(1956) , these models have been extensively used by both policy makers and researchers. With the popularization of Discrete Stochastic General Equilibrium(DSGE) models, there has been attempts to develop a DSGE version of life-cycle model. To my knowledge, the …rst of such model was developed by Gali(1990) which tried to …nd evidence of life cycle behavior in a DSGE model by adopting the Blanchard-Yarri model. But in order to avoid problems with aggregation, he assumed an identical(and constant) MPC for the workers and the retirees. Clarida(1991) was able to develop a DSGE life cycle model where he was able to achieve aggregation without assuming constant or identical MPC for all cohorts. My model is very close to Gertler(1999) . He developed a DSGE life-cycle model which was a modi…ed version of Blachard-Yarri(1965) model where he added a transitional probability to retirement in addition to the original generational index parameter, the transitional probability to death. Gertler's model has di¤erent MPC's for di¤erent groups. Based on his assumption on the preference structure, Gertler argued that all the works have identical MPC and all the retirees have same MPC. He was then able to aggregate all the consumption functions of workers of di¤erent age and did the same thing for all the retirees. This allowed him to derive an aggregate consumption function for the workers and also for the retirees. He also developed aggregate human and non-human wealth functions for the economy and carried out various …scal experiments. Recently Ferrero(2005), Kilponen Gertler(1999) model further and studied di¤erent aspects of population ageing in their models. The main advantages of using Gertler's framework is that one can apply various tools used in the Real Business Cycle literature and analyze not only the stationary equilibrium, but also the transition path. But perhaps the most popular Life cycle simulated models were developed by Auerbach and Kotilioko¤(1987) . While analysis of debt in a representative agent might be misleading 1 , the analysis based on the simulated life cycle models does not o¤er any analytical tractability. Second, other than few authors such as Kotiliko¤, most of the researchers focus on various ways to make the existing PAYGO system more e¢ cient. A comparative analysis of major alternative social security system is nearly absent. Kotliko¤, Smetters and Walliser(1999) analyzes the e¢ cacy of alternative privatized social security systems using their famous simulated A-K model. De Nardi, · Imrohoro¼ glu and Sargent(1999) on the other hand analyzes the impact of various …scal policy measures to the retirement of the baby boomers under the present social security system. Finally, the work closest to my paper are Bohn(2002 Bohn( , 1999 Bohn( , 1998 ) which carry out a comparative analysis of various alternative social security and debt management schemes using an OLG framework. Although his analysis provides signi…cant insight into the e¢ cacy of alternative policy regime, the OLG framework limits its applicability for policy analysis. In a two period stochastic OLG framework, although Bohn uses several RBC tools that I will also employ, I will be able to analyze the entire transition path of the economy before and after a demographic shock which the former was not able to do. The short run e¢ cacy of alternative policy regime is equally important for policy makers. This paper will therefore be a value addition to that literature. My model is also different from the original work by Gertler(1999) . His model has social security in the form of a lump-sump tax-transfer scheme. This is clearly unrealistic, as Gertler himself acknowledges. My model will have full speci…cation of various social security regimes. My paper also di¤ers from Gertler(1999) in terms of policy analysis. Gertler focuses mainly on various …scal experiments like changing the government debt. He also conducts some demographic experiments like changing the dependency ratio by experimenting on transitional probability of death and experimenting on the transition to retirement. My experiments will be di¤erent because I will focus only on introducing demographic shock to the growth rate of the workforce. Although my experiments will have similar e¤ect on the dependency ratio as Gertler, the source of that is di¤erent. Finally, I will completely obstruct away from introducing any government debt in my model, which is the driving force in Gertler's experiments.
Keeping in mind the above mentioned issues, I plan to develop a DSGE Life cycle model with a fully developed social security system. I would like to incorporate some fundamental uncertainties that were outlined in Bohn(2002) and Gertler(1999) . In my model, I would like to analyze how basic uncertainties are shared by the workers and the retirees under alternative social security arrangement. My basic model would be an extended version of Gertler(1999) . To introduce life-cycle factors but maintain tractability, Gertler made two kinds of modi…cations of the Blanchard/Weil framework. First, Gertler introduced two stages of life: work and retirement. Gertler then imposed a constant transition probability per period for a worker into retirement, as well as a constant probability per period of death for a retiree. In my model, both the transition probability per period of death and retirement would be stochastic with both following an iid process . Second, Gertler employed a class of non-expected utility preferences proposed by Kreps and Porteus(1978) and later popularized by Farmer (1990) , Weil(1990) and Epstein and Zin(1990) that generate certainty-equivalent decision rules in the presence of income risk. Gertler showed that with these two modi…cations it is possible to derive aggregate consumption/savings relations for workers and for retirees. It is also possible to express the current equilibrium values of all the endogenous variables as functions of just two predetermined variables: the capital stock and the distribution of nonhuman wealth between retirees and workers. In my model, I will focus on the aggregate behavior of the Workers and the Retirees separately and keep track of the evolution of their human(wage income) and non-human(income from savings on capital asset) wealth. Because the model permits realistic average periods of work and retirement, the model is useful for quantitative policy analysis in a way that complements the use of large-scale models. The advantage of this framework is its parsimonious representation, which helps make clear the factors that underlie the results. In particular, it is possible to obtain an analytical solution for aggregate consumption behavior, conditional on the paths of wages and interest rates. In this case with variable work e¤ort, it is also possible to …nd an analytical solution for aggregate labor supply. Since the e¤ects of government and social security on the economy in this framework work their way through consumption and labor supply, these (partial) analytical solutions will help clarify the nature and strength of the policy transmission mechanisms. Further, because of its parsimony, it is straightforward to integrate this life-cycle setup into existing growth and business-cycle models in order to study a much broader set of issues which have already been starting to be analyzed by many researchers.
Basic feature of the Life-cycle model
In this model, individuals have …nite lives and they evolve through two distinct stages of life: work and retirement. To derive a tractable aggregate consumption function and at the same time permit realistic (average) lengths of work and retirement, I make three kinds of assumptions. These assumptions involve: (1) population dynamics; (2) insurance arrangements; and (3) preferences.
Demographic feature
The population dynamics will follow a natural ordering to allow for tractability of our model. Consumers are assumed to be born as workers. Workers face a constant retirement probability !:Conditional on being a worker in the current period, the probability of remaining one in the next period is !; while the probability of retiring is 1 !. These transition probabilities are independent on individual's employment tenure. Once an individual has retired he is facing a periodic probability of death 1
. The survival probability is assumed to be independent of retirement tenure. Let us denote N w t and N r t to be the total number of workers and retirees. In period t + 1;I assume that there would be (1 + n t+1 !)new workers born, where n t is another white noise process with mean n and a variance 2 . Hence the workers'population follows the following law of motion:
The retiree population follows law of motion:
to be the ratio of retiree to the worker, the dependency ratio. Using equation(1) and (2), we can show that the dependency ratio follows law of motion:
By using equation (3) we can drive the following:
ln n t+1 = n ln n t + e 1t+1 , 0 < n < 1 (6.a)
Where N t is the total population at time t which is simply de…ned as follows
Furthermore, in the stationary equilibrium, t+1 = t = , n t+1 = n. Then N w t+1 ,N r t+1 and N t+1 all grow at the same rate n and the population dynamics in this model is stationary.
Insurance Market
To eliminate the impact of uncertainty about time of death, I introduce a perfect annuities market, following Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985) . The annuities market provides perfect insurance against this kind of uncertainty. Under the arrangement, each retiree e¤ectively turns over his wealth to a mutual fund that invests the proceeds. The fraction of those that survive to the next period receive all the returns, while the (estates of) the fraction 1 who die receive nothing. Each surviving retiree receives a return that is proportionate to his initial contribution of wealth to the mutual fund. Thus, for example, if R t+1 is the gross return per dollar invested by the mutual fund, the gross return on wealth for a surviving retiree is Rt+1 :
Preference
Now the timing of economic decisions are very important. Each persons make all his decisions at the beginning of time, all his decisions are ex-ante.Now we will de…ne the utility function of an individual who derives utility from consumption, c and leisure (1 l). Following Kreps and Porteus(1978), and Farmer(1990), we will use a special class CES non-expected utility function. The parametric form of the utility function will be following Weil(1990)
This preference structure has the convenient property of separating between the elasticity of inter temporal substitution given by = 1 (1 ) and the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion, given by : Following Gertler(1999) and Ferrero(2005), we assume = 1:Then equation (8) can be written as:
According to Farmer(1990) , These preferences generate certainty-equivalent decisions rules in the face of idiosyncratic income risk, in contrast to standard Von-Neumann/Morgenstern utility functions. Roughly speaking, because preferences are over the mean of next period's value function, individuals only care about the …rst moment of expected income in deriving their decision rules) 2 .
On the other hand, they do care about smoothing consumption over time. The curvature parameter introduces a smooth trade-o¤ for individuals between consuming today versus consuming tomorrow. In analogy to the standard case, the desire to smooth consumption implies a …nite inter temporal elasticity of substitution , given by = 1 (1 ) . Thus a virtue of the preference structure is that it permits ‡exibility over the choice of , which is a key parameter in determining the quantitative e¤ects of debt and social security. Furthermore, Weil(1990) argues that the value of determines people's attitude towards intertemporal substitution, or inter temporal consumption smoothing.
< 1 means Income e¤ects are smaller than Substitution e¤ect and vice versa for > 1:This certainty-equivalent analysis clari…es the respective role of risk aversion and inter temporal substitution. The substitution e¤ect depresses the marginal propensity to save as soon as agents are risk averse, as the optimum way to maintain the original utility level when wage income risk increases is to consume more today (and thus avoid facing the increased risk). The income e¤ect is simply a precautionary savings e¤ect, whose magnitude depends on the inter temporal elasticity of substitution: increased wage risk implies a higher probability of low consumption tomorrow, against which consumers will protect themselves the more, by consuming less, the more averse they are to inter temporal ‡uctuations of consumption. Which of these two con ‡icting e¤ects dominates depends on the strength of the precautionary motive, i.e., on the magnitude of the inter temporal elasticity of substitution.
Finally, we assume the period utility function is Cobb-Douglas. With that the recursive utility function of the agents in the model:
Where:
Therefore, this preference representation now has conveniently separated period elasticity of substitution v and inter temporal elasticity of substitution for consumption. Now I will proceed to solve the optimization problem by both the worker and the retiree. Both worker and retiree have 1 unit of time which they allocate between work(l) and leisure. Both receive the same wage W t :But the retirees are less productive than the worker, which will be re ‡ected by a productivity parameter :
Model with Private Annuity Market
In the baseline mode, we will consider optimization by the agents without any government intervention. There will only be an annuity market .
Optimization by the Retiree
Retirees consume out of asset income and labor income. In general, one can index each retiree by the time he was born j and the time he left the labor force k. Ultimately, it will not be necessary to keep track of how assets and consumption are distributed among retirees over j and k. Under my assumptions one can simply aggregate across di¤erent cohorts. Let A rjk t and C rjk t be the assets at the beginning of time t and consumption at t, respectively, of a retired person who was born at time jand left the labor force at time k; and let R t be the gross return on assets from period t 1 to t. For a retiree at t who participates in a perfect annuities market, his optimization problem looks like:
Subject to:
With 0 1: Following Gertler(2000),the consumer's optimization has to satisfy additional conditions. The …rst one is as follows:
The above equation is meant to rule out Ponzi schemes. The individual has to satisfy an intertemporal budget constraint. He eventually has to pay o¤ any debt, he cannot continuously play with Ponzi schemes. As it turns out, the above condition is not su¢ cient. We need a stronger condition for optimization under uncertainty. The in…nite horizon budget constraint now has to hold in expectations. It has to hold both in ex-ante and ex-post sense since the individual is allowed to borrow only at riskless rate. It has to hold for every possible realization of W t and R t which are essentially random variables. Thus the individual can borrow risklessly but has to be able to pay back the debt. Therefore, the optimization problem of retiree has to satisfy the following intertemporal budget constraint:
Where H rjk t is the expected lifetime labor income of the retiree de…ned later. We also need the following requirement:
Where the last condition is a stationary condition on the fW t g 1 t=0 process.
The …rst order condition with respect C r t along with respective envelope conditions 3 yields the following euler equation for the retiree:
The …rst order condition with respect to l rjk t along with respective envelope conditions yields the following conditions:
where
In order to derive a decision rule for the retiree we employ Modigliani(1963) idea that a person consumes a fraction of this life time income. Therefore, I guess that the consumption function looks like:
Where t is the marginal propensity to consume(MPC) out of life income for the retiree. A r t 1 is the total non-human asset accumulated up to time t and H r t is the expected lifetime labor income for the retiree, which is given by:
We will also guess the following form for the v r t ,
After some math, we can prove the following:
Also, the MPC follows the following law of motion:
Optimization by the Worker
The worker's maximization problem looks like:
where the second budget constraint is for the worker who was worker today(t) but will become retiree tomorrow(t + 1). As a result, this new retiree was not able to put his wealth into the annuity market. Also, when the workers of period t retires at period t + 1, he will no longer have his labor income as a worker.
Similar to the retiree, we need Ponzi constraint for the worker which looks like:
Where t+i is an additional factor that is used to weight the gross interest rate, to be de…ned later. This will along with equation (16) give us an intertemporal budget constraint for the worker which looks like:
The problem of the worker is quite complicated and the …rst order conditions are messy. In order to simplify our calculation, We will guess that the consumption function looks like:
Where t is the marginal propensity to consume out of life income for the worker. A wjk t 1 is the total non-human asset accumulated up to time t and H wjk t is the expected lifetime labor income for the retiree, which is given by:
where:
where: (31) and t follows the following law of motion:
Now we will guess a functional form for V wjk t :
The …rst order condition with respect to C wjk t along with respective envelope conditions and equation (30) yields the following euler equation:
Finally, the …rst order condition for l wjk t looks like
Derivation of Aggregate Functions
If we look at the consumption functions for a workers, we see two things. First, the MPC at time period t will be the same for all the workers. Second, The only thing that will di¤er is their lifetime accumulated income which will vary with each cohort. We can therefore, proceed to aggregate the consumption for all the workers for a given period t. We will …rst drop all the j and k subscript and derive some more aggregate variables: Total labor supply by workers
Total labor supply by the retirees:
The aggregate e¤ective labor supply to the economy:
Aggregate non-human wealth by all worker at time t:
The aggregate life time labor income of the workers at time t
By summing up the individual guess function for Consumption, we can derive the aggregate consumption function for workers
Similarly, we can derive aggregate relationships for the retirees:
The aggregate wealth of the economy for the workers and the retirees look like:
(46)
Let us de…ne A t 1 as the aggregate wealth of the economy at period t and t 1 =
as the share of the asset held by the retirees. It also follows that
. Using these two and also equation (41) and (42)we can rewrite the aggregate wealth of the economy as follows
Finally, using the de…nition of the aggregate wealth, equation (38) and (39) looks like:
Production side of the economy
Production is subject to a neoclassical production function with labor augmenting technological progress:
where the technology follows an AR(1) process:
The wage rate and return on capital are determined as:
Capital evolves according to the following law of motion:
Finally we close the model by specifying the relationship between the capital stock and the wealth 4 :
De…nition of Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of endogenous predetermined variables {K t 1 ; A r t 1 ; A w t 1 } and a sequence of endogenous variables f t ; t ; t ; H r t ; H w t ; C w t ; C r t ; W t ; R t ; A w t ; A r t g, that satisfy equations 37-56, given the sequence of the exogenous predetermined variables {N t+1 , X t+1 } speci…ed by (6) and (59), and given the initial values of all the predetermined variables, K t , A t , N t , and X t .
Model with PAYGO-De…ned Bene…t Social Security System
In the PAYGO model we will consider optimization where there is a PAYGO social security system for the retiree. The role of the government will be to carry out this transfer to the present retirees by taxing the present workers. The government will impose a payroll tax on the workers. The retirees, although working, are not subject to the payroll tax. The bene…t which will include a participation rate which will determine how much transfer the retirees receive will be …xed in the de…ned bene…t case. The above two are assumptions of the model where the former is made to simplify the solution of the model and the latter is a speci…cation used in the literature. The income of the retirees will still be annuitized so that accidental bequest is prevented.
Optimization by the Retiree
The optimization problem by the retiree looks very similar to the baseline case except for the fact that the retirees now also receive a social security payment E rjk t = BW t , where B is a …xed de…ned bene…t rate, or the participation rate. For a retiree at t who participates in a perfect annuities market, his optimization problem looks like:
With 0 1:
4 In order to see that equation(56) holds, lets add up equation (45) and (46), and we get A
Using the fact that, At 1 = A r t 1 + A w t 1 for t and t 1 and equation (39), and substituting the value of Rt and Wt from equation (53) and (54), the above equation can be written as:
Now if Kt 1 = At 1, then the above equation can be written as:
Where the right hand side of the equation is identical to the right hand side of equation (55). Therefore, Kt = At Similar to the private annuity market case, the retirees will have a Ponzi constraint like equation (14) . Their intertemporal budget constraint now looks like:
Where S rjk t is expected lifetime social security payment to the retiree, to be de…ned later. The …rst order condition with respect C r t along with respective envelope conditions yields very similar Euler equation for the retiree:
where is de…ned in equation (18) Similar to the baseline case, I guess that the consumption function looks like:
Where t is the marginal propensity to consume(MPC) out of life income for the retiree. A r t 1 is the total non-human asset accumulated up to time t and H r t is the expected lifetime labor income for the retiree, de…ned in equation (21) and S rjk t is the expected lifetime social security payment which is given by:
Lets explain the term on the right hand side of the equation (62). E r t+v = N r t+v BW t+v is the total social security payments that all the retirees expect to get paid at some period in the future t + v:In order to get the individual transfer, we divide it by the total retiree population in period t + v:This individual payment is conditional on the fact that the retiree survives up to period v. That is why v is multiplied with the individual transfer. Finally, we have to discount the transfer to get the present value all future social security payment. This explains the discounting term in the denominator.
We will also have similar guess of the following form for the v r t ,
Where we can again prove that
Finally, the MPC follows the same law of motion as with the baseline case
Optimization by the Worker
The worker's problem would also be similar except now he has to pay a payroll tax on his wage income. We will assume that the worker pays a constant payroll tax on his wage income. The worker's maximization problem looks like:
where the intuition behind the equation (67) and (68) was explained in the previous section. The Ponzi constraint of the worker is same as the private annuity case. Now the intertemporal budget constraint looks like the following:
Where S wjk t is expected lifetime social security payment to the worker, to be de…ned later. We will again guess that the consumption function looks like:
where t+1 has been de…ned in the last section. Now S wjk t is the present value of expected lifetime social security that the workers will receive when they retire. S wjk t will be de…ned as follows:
Lets explain the term on the right hand side of the equation (71). If the worker retires in period t + v + 1, he will receive a social security payment of S r t+v+1 divided by the population at
is the capitalized value of the social security for a worker who was working at period t + v and retired at t + v + 1:In order to receive that social security payment, the person has to be a worker up to period t + v and then retires with probability (1 !) at t + v + 1. This explains why ! v (1 !) is multiplied with the capitalized value. Finally, in order to get the present value of the social security payment at period t, we have discount this future payment. This explains the discounting factor that appears in the denominator of equation (71).
The law of motion for t looks like:
We will have similar guess about the functional form for V wjk t
:
The …rst order condition with respect to C wjk t along with respective envelope conditions and equation (30) yields the following Euler equation:
where is de…ned in the previous section. Finally, the …rst order condition for l wjk t looks like very similar to the baseline case
Derivation of Aggregate Functions
In the case of the PAYGO-DB system, there will be an additional aggregate constraints, the government budget. Following Bohn(2002) , the government uses …xed pension bene…t …nanced by a payroll tax on the current workers. Taxes and Bene…ts are conveniently stated in terms of a payroll tax rate t and a …xed replacement rate B:Denoting t W t L w t real value of aggregate tax revenue from the worker and E r t = N r t BW t to be the real value of aggregate social security payment to the retiree, the Government Budget constraint looks like
In order to derive the rest of the aggregate relationships, we aggregate equations 60-75 according to their respective populations and get the following
The equations for t and t , K t ,R t , W t , X t , t , N w t , n t+1 and Y t are same as the previous section.
The Production side of the economy did not change. We can therefore proceed to de…ne the Competitive equilibrium in the PAYGO system
De…nition of Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium in the PAYGO system is a sequence of endogenous predetermined variables fK t 1 ; A r6 Model with PAYGO-De…ned Contribution Social Security System
The PAYGO-De…ned Contribution will be identical to the De…ned bene…t system except for the fact that now the contribution will be …xed. Following Bohn(2002) again,the government uses pension bene…t …nanced by a …xed payroll tax on the current workers. Taxes and Bene…ts are conveniently stated in terms of a …xed payroll tax rate and a variable replacement rate B t :Denoting W t L w t real value of aggregate tax revenue from the worker and E r t = N r t B t W t to be the real value of aggregate social security payment to the retiree, the government budget constraint looks like
The optimization will be identical to the de…ned bene…t case, including the Ponzi constraints and the intertemporal budget constraints. Most of the aggregate relationships will remain unchanged. The ones that will changed are summarized as follows:
The de…nition of competitive equilibrium will be identical to the de…ned bene…t case where the above new equations has to be satis…ed in equilibrium.
Model with Fully Funded-De…ned Bene…t Social Security
In the Fully Funded(FF from now on) de…ned bene…t model we will consider optimization where there is a FF social security system for the retiree. This system is di¤erent from the PAYGO system in a number of ways. First, under the FF system, a worker pays payroll tax throughout his working life. Second, this tax revenue is put into a fund where the government invests the proceeds(social security fund). Finally, when the person retires, he receives social security which would be the tax revenue he accumulated plus the interest. For simplicity, we will assume the worker pays a payroll tax t . The retirees again will not be taxed. When the worker moves into the retirement phase, he will receive the accumulated tax revenue plus interest. Making retirement bene…t continent on the life long tax payments throughout working phase is the correct mechanism. But it is very complicated, we will assume that the retirees bene…t is linked to the taxes paid right before retirement. In this way, the fully funded de…ned bene…t(DB) system will be a notional fully funded system where the …nancing formula uses a Bismarckian Rule 5 , where the pensions are related to the partial earnings history, in our case, the history just before retirement.
Optimization by the Retiree
The optimization problem by the retiree looks very similar to the PAYGO De…ned Bene…t case, including the Ponzi constraints and the intertemporal budget constraints, except for the fact that the retirees'social security now depends on the tax collected from the workers previously. For a retiree at t who participates in a perfect annuities market, he chooses C rjk ; l rjk to maximize (57) subject to the (58). The …rst order conditions are same as (59) and (60).
Similar to the PAYGO case, I guess that the consumption function looks like:
t ,A r t 1 ,H r t has been de…ned before and S rjk t is the expected lifetime social security payment which, although de…ned before, is given by:
Where E r t+v = N r t+v BW t+v is the aggregate social security payments that all the retirees in period t receives. We will also have similar guess for the V r t as (63) and condition (89) has to be satis…ed. The MPC of the retirees will also follows the same law of motion as the equation (65) 
Optimization by the Worker
The worker's problem would also be similar except now he has to pay a payroll tax on his wage income. We will assume that the worker pays a constant payroll tax t on his wage income. The worker's will choose C wjk t ; l wjk t to maximize (66) subject to (67) and (68). We will again guess identical function for the consumption function as the PAYGO-DB. All the variables have the same functional form. The law of motion for t is identical as the PAYGO-DB case. We will have similar guess about the functional form for V wjk t .The …rst order condition with respect to C wjk t and l wjk t yields identical solutions as the PAYGO-DB case.
Derivation of Aggregate Functions
Just like the PAYGO-DB system, in the case of the FF-DB system, there will be an additional aggregate constraint, the government budget. The government distribute social security payment among the retirees which will be collected as payroll tax from the workers from the previous period. Following Abel(2003) and Karni and Zilcha(1989) , denoting t W t 1 L w t 1 aggregate tax revenue from the worker from period t 1 and N r t BW t to be the aggregate social security payment to the retiree, the Government Budget constraint looks like
The capital market clearing condition now looks like:
The rest of the aggregate relationships are identical to equations (77)-(85).
De…nition of Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium in the FF-DB will be same as the PAYGO-DB where all the previous conditions have to be satis…ed and also equation 93 and 94 are satis…ed.
Model with Fully Funded-De…ned Contribution Social Security
The FF-DC will be identical to the DB system except for the fact that now the contribution will be …xed. Following Karni and Zilcha(1989) again,the FF-DC budget constraint looks like:
All other aggregate relationships will remain unchanged except some whose form will look like the new set of equations de…ned in case of the PAYGO-DC case.
Calibration and nature of experiments under di¤erent pension systems
There are two sources of growth in this economy, the population growth and the technological progress. Thus in steady state all the quantity variables grow at the exogenously given rate of growth of the e¤ective labor force, X t L w t , which is equal to (1 + x)(1 + n) (1 + x + n). Because there is growth in the steady state, we have normalize each of the choice variables. For Y t ; H r t ; H w t ; C w t ; C r t ; L w t ; L r t ; L t and K t 1 , we use X t N w t and for W t we use X t as the scaling factor. Appendix 1,2 and 3 shows the derivation, scaling and the steady state system for the private annuity market without social security. The rest of the models are derived in the similar manner. Table 1 shows calibrated values of the exogenous parameters used in this paper. The calibration of each of the models is very crucial. It is therefore important to specify the calibration strategy very clearly. First, PAYGO-DB will serve as the baseline model for this paper because it is the system that operates in existence. In order to calibrate the model to derive steady state values of our choice variables, I will choose values for the exogenous parameters ; ; ; ; ; !; ; ; x; n and :The value of and ! are taken from Auerbach and Kotiliko¤(1987) . They are chosen so that a person spends 45 years as worker and 10 years as retired.Following Ferrero(2005), individuals are assumed to enter the workforce as workers when they are 20 years old and work on average (1 !) 1 years. The value of the parameter ! = 0:977 is chosen to match a 45-year average permanence in the labor force, which corresponds to Auerbach and Kotiliko¤(1987) , where the calibration is done as follows:
The value of the survival probability of a retiree, is chosen to be 0.80 to match the average expected lifetime horizon for a retiree, which is equal to 70 years for the US and EU. The formula works as follows:
Therefore, we use the above mentioned values for the choice parameters. The value of and is taken from Cooley(1995). The rest of the variables are taken from Campbell(1994) but can also be found in Rebelo and King(1988) . The value of and are the most crucial and controversial parameters of the model. I will calibrate them simultaneously along with two other important variables of the model, the social security tax and the replacement rate, or the bene…t rate. The choice of using appropriate value for the social security tax and the bene…t rule is very important. Bohn(2002) uses the value of to be 12.4% and value of the bene…t rate to be be in between 30% and 40%. But unlike him, I have more restriction in my calibration because I have to also match the real interest rate for the economy which should be very close to 3%. I will choose a plausible value for so that I get a plausible value for the participation rate. In case of the PAYGO-DB, I will choose and to be 0.50 and 0.96 and the participation rate to be 24.9%. The system of nonlinear equations in the steady state then will yield a steady state tax rate to be equal to 12.4% which matches with Bohn(2002) 6 .These two values will serve as the benchmark values. In case of the DB systems, we will keep the participation rate constant at 24.9% and determine the tax rate. In case of the DC systems, we will keep the tax rate constant 6 Trying to calibrate the value of participation rate to be equal to 30% and tax rate to be 12.4% and achieve a real interest rate to be close to 3 % was a di¢ cult task and will consider values of and which are usually used in the literature. I will therefore, only use plausible values of them . This will give a real interest rate which is close to 3%, a tax rate which is 12.4% and a bene…t rate which is close to 30%. at 12.4% and will determine the participation rate. As we will show, in order to get tax rate and participation rate under the FF system similar to the the PAYGO, we will assume the value of to be 0.958 instead of 0.96. For the Private Annuity market, I will use the baseline parameter from the PAYGO-DB system. Table-1 reports all the parameter values to be used in the model. Now the nature of the experiment that I will conduct has to be speci…ed clearly. My experiment will look at the impulse response functions and transitional dynamics of the systems when there is an unanticipated permanent 1% increase in the growth rate of workforce. I will use Gensys algorithm to derive my impulse response functions. My methodology to derive impulse response of a permanent shock will follow Leeper and Yang(2006) . De…neẐ t = log( s Zt s Z ) to be the log deviation of a variable from its balanced growth trajectories. We then log-linearize the entire system of equations and feed in to the Gensys algorithm developed by Sims(2002). After identifying that the systems have a unique solution,I proceed to derive the impulse response functions of the choice variables for a one percent permanent shock to the growth rate of the workforce. The derivation is done in two steps. First, Gensys calculates the initial response of the variables to the population shock. Next, I iterate on the initial response for 100 periods and derive the impulse response functions of the variables in the system.
Comparison of Performance under di¤erent Social security
Our economic analysis of the economy under alternative pensions systems will be done in six steps. First, we will look at performance of the economy under initial steady state of the system when the population is stationary. Second, we will look at the immediate response of the economy of a permanent population shock. Third, we will look at the dynamics of the economy during the transition to the new steady state. Fourth, we will compare the economy under initial and new steady state. Fifth, we will compare the social welfare of the economy before and after the permanent population shock. Finally, we will simulate our model and compare the volatility of the fundamental variables of our model under di¤erent social security regime when there is a population shock. Table 2 reports the steady state values of the variables of each of the systems before and after a permanent shock. We see several interesting results. First, In the initial steady state, the MPC for the retiree is signi…cantly larger than the MPC for the workers under alternative systems. Lower MPC for the worker is a desirable property of my life-cycle model because it is consistent with the classic lifecycle model predictions of Modigliani(1956) and Harrod(1948) . Therefore, the model passes the …rst acid test because it mimics life-cycle consumption propensity. Second, The initial steady state capital is also largest for the perfect annuity model. The PAYGO system has higher capital than the FF system. The initial steady state capital is also higher under PAYGO for both the worker and the retiree. Third, Overall, the retirees supply little labor compared to the workers. In the initial steady state,total labor supply is the largest for the perfect annuity model. Worker's labor supply is lowest under FF system. Retiree's labor supply is similar under PAYGO or FF and lower than perfect annuity market. According to Feldstein(2005) , a perfect annuity market with no social security will surely yield higher capital accumulation when there is stationary population. This is because social security involves some form of taxation(either …xed or ‡exible) which distorts savings by the worker. This is evident by a 17% decline in initial steady state savings(comparing row 9, column 2 and column 5 of table 2) by the worker under PAYGO and a 21% decline in case of FF(comparing row 9, column 2 and column 8 of table 2). Again, social security bene…ts(de…ned or ‡exible) distorts savings by the retiree which was highlighted by Bohn(2002) . The disincentive of the retiree to save more results in a 56% reduction in savings under PAYGO and a 62% decline in case of FF. Overall, there is a 11% decline in total savings under PAYGO and 15% decline under FF. These are much lower compared to a 30-50% reduction estimated by Feldstein(1974) . But the puzzling fact is that FF yields lower savings than PAYGO. A closer analysis should resolve this issue. First, notice that the nature of income inequality is identical under PAYGO and FF in the initial steady state. Second, retirees labor supply under these two regimes are almost identical. Hence, total labor supply decline because of the decline in worker's labor supply. With a slightly higher wage in the PAYGO systems, the retirees enjoy higher labor income than FF. Although rental rate is slightly lower under the PAYGO, the workers with much bigger chunk of capital earns a higher capital income than the retirees. Finally, since the social security bene…t is same under PAYGO and FF in the initial steady state(as was the objective of my calibration exercise), the retirees, overall, has lower income under FF than under PAYGO. Therefore, PAYGO with higher income for both workers and retirees results in a higher capital accumulation in PAYGO than FF. From the risk sharing perspective of the social security systems, we notice one striking result. In an economy where the retirees work part time , an Intergenerational risk sharing mechanism like the FF systems fail to outperform an Intergenerational risk sharing mechanism like the PAYGO. The above analysis suggests that the distortion created by social security has been dominated by a combination of favorable rental rate and an unfavorable wage rate movement. Bohn(1998) argues that this is only possible when 1 is below the capital and labor share of the output. In our PAYGO and FF models, the former is 0.1415 where the later two are 0.333 and 0.667 respectively. Again since the capital-share of output dominates labor share, interest rate movement dominates the wage rate movement e¤ect. Finally,The initial steady state output is the largest for the perfect annuity model. The PAYGO systems have higher output than the FF systems. The …rst part of the observation is consistent with other works on life-cycle models like Feldstein(1974) and Feldstein(2005) which argue that a fully e¢ cient perfect annuity market creates no additional distortion in the economy and therefore, should yield higher output. The better performance of the PAYGO models follow from the superior performance of the former in terms of capital accumulation and inducing slightly higher labor supply than the FF model. Table 3 reports the immediate response of each of the systems after a permanent population shock. The responses are presented in log deviating terms from the initial balanced growth trajectories, which in terms of our scaled variable models, a log-deviation from the initial steady state. We notice some interesting aspects of the immediate responses. First, Consumption of both worker and retiree responds positively to the population growth shock. The response is largest under the private annuity model. DC systems o¤er better response to consumption. Second, PAYGO-DB seems to share consumption risk across the workers and the retirees better than any other social security arrangements. The private annuity market has the worst risk sharing performance. Third, capital shows consistent decline across all models. The rate of decline is the smallest under PAYGO-DB. Workers savings shows slower decline than the retirees. Retirees savings decline faster under the DC systems, specially under the FF. Fourth,Output response is smallest under the PAYGO-DC. Fifth, total labor supply declines immediately across all regimes. Workers increase their labor supply under the DB systems and decrease under DC. The retirees dramatically decreases their labor supply consistently across di¤erent regimes. Sixth, upon impact, decline in output is smallest under FF-DB. Seventh,upon impact, decline in capital is the smallest under the DB systems. Eighth, upon impact, the absolute di¤erence between the response of the workers and the retirees are the smallest under FF-DB, then under PAYGO-DB.
Analysis of Initial Steady State

Analysis of Immediate Impact of a Permanent Population Shock
The di¤erence is largest under the Private Insurance model. Finally, impact on wage is positive across all regimes. Impact on real interest rate is positive only under the DB systems.
Although analyzing risk sharing behavior is not the main purpose of this paper, this is indeed a very interesting results which needs some explanations. Bohn(2002) argues that population risk are not naturally shared by di¤erent cohorts. Population growth raises the marginal product of capital and while it reduces the marginal product of labor. Government policy can allocate this risk by appropriate transfers and taxes. We see this result in our model too. Measuring risk sharing by looking at the absolute di¤erence between the immediate response of consumption for the workers and the retirees 7 (row 4, table 6), we see that the private annuity market clearly fails to share risk associated with the population shock in Bohn's sense. Similar to Bohn, PAYGO-DB outperforms all other social security arrangement.
An analysis of the causes behind the above mentioned results are crucial for understanding the entire dynamical response of our model to population shock under di¤erent regimes. We will adopt a blend of RBC and public …nance approach to explain the immediate response of our models. Combining Rebelo and King(2002) and Bohn(1998), we will decompose the e¤ect of population shock into wage e¤ ect and interest e¤ ect and the social security e¤ ect. In case of the PAYGO-DB, we will start with the social security e¤ect. An increase in the number of worker reduces the dependency ratio, which with a DB system, reduces payroll tax(table 3, row 21 and 22) . This results in a decline of the total bene…t to the retirees, although the bene…t rule is …xed(table 3, row 21 and 23). The social security e¤ect is therefore a negative income e¤ect to the retiree and a positive income e¤ect on the worker. With almost no to very small decline in the real interest rate,retirees savings go down. The wage e¤ect of the population is very strange. There is a an immediate reduction of labor supply by the worker and the retiree. We therefore see a slight increase in the wage rate. The running down of savings and the decline labor supply also justi…es the immediate increase in consumption for both the worker and the retiree. The PAYGO-DB shares similar dynamics with the FF-DB. With PAYGO-DC, however, there is a small visible decline in the real interest rate with larger increase in wage. The decline is labor supply is now larger a which coupled with a larger decline now reduces output at a higher rate. The FF-DC exhibits similar behavior as the PAYGO-DC. The transitional dynamics will also analyzed by using wage rate, interest rate e¤ect and the social security e¤ect.
Analysis of the Transition Path after a Permanent Population Shock
In case of the PAYGO-DB, wage goes down, real interest rate goes up and social security tax goes down in the transition. For the worker, he faces a combination of negative wage raterelated income e¤ect, positive interest rate-related income e¤ect and a positive payroll tax-related income e¤ect. The negative e¤ects dominate at the beginning and we see an increase in labor supply. After that and we see a steady decline of consumption, savings and labor supply. For the retiree, his social security e¤ect is negative, because total bene…t falls. For him, negative e¤ects now dominate and we see gradual increase in labor supply, decline in consumption and savings. The overall e¤ect on capital accumulation is quite negative and the e¤ect on total labor supply is slightly positive during the transition path. We therefore see a slow decline in the output. Therefore, PAYG0-DB social security distorts output, savings, consumption smoothing and forces retirees to work more.
In case of the PAYGO-DC, the retirees now receive larger total bene…t because the bene…t rate goes up. But the negative wage e¤ect clearly dominates and we see similar increase labor supply as with the PAYGO-DB. But favorable movement of the bene…t and interest rate allows them to decrease saving slowly. On the other hand, a decline in wage coupled with a …xed tax rate implies a larger tax burden on the worker. His after tax wage is smaller. This results in a rapid de-accumulation of savings along with a slight decline in the labor supply. The ultimate outcome is again a decline in capital and output.
In case of the FF-DB, a decline in the tax rate results in a decline in the total bene…t for the retiree. This and the decline in wage triggers a melt down of savings for the retiree along with an increase in the labor supply. The negative wage e¤ect for the worker cannot be compensated by the reduction in tax rate. Hence we see a similar decline in savings and a small decline in labor supply. The …nal outcome is a decline in output and savings.
In case of the FF-DC, the e¤ect on the worker mimics PAYG0-DC. But for retiree, the increase in total bene…t enables them to de-accumulate savings slower than FF-DB. But this time, worker dominates and wee see a slightly decline in output and capital.
The private annuity model is also quite interesting. Without social security, retiree now works more, saves much less. The worker on the other hand, does not face any tax distortion. This allows him to de-accumulate his savings slowly, consume more compared to rest of the regimes and increase the supply of labor. All this results in output and capital levels along transition path which are visibly higher than any other social security regime.
In summary, the transition dynamics is determined by the combination of wage, interest rate and social security e¤ect. In these experiments, wage e¤ect will dominate the interest rate e¤ect. With PAYGO-DB, the negative wage e¤ect slightly overcomes positive real interest rate and tax e¤ect for the worker. For the retiree, negative wage and total bene…t e¤ect clearly outweighs the positive real interest rate e¤ect. In case of PAYGO-DC, the increase in the total bene…t has a positive e¤ect on retirees income which creates larger distortion in savings and labor supply decision. As a result, we end up with slightly lower output in the new steady state than the PAYGO-DB. The FF-DB adds to the woes of the retirees by decreasing their bene…t. The result is a lower accumulation of capital and hence, output compared to the PAYGO-DB case. Finally, FF-DC performs the worst because the negative wage e¤ect is the largest and the increase in the real interest rate causes largest decline in their lifetime labor income and lifetime social security. The result is the lowest accumulation of capital and hence, lowest output. None of the social security distortion is present in the private annuity market. Hence it performs the best in terms of capital accumulation and output. Table 2 shows a comparison between initial steady state and the new one. The dynamic responses of the system is not fundamentally di¤erent across regime. A worker population growth rate worsens economic conditions in all the regimes, consumption, output and savings all go down. Private annuity market performs better than any other social security regime in absorbing the shock. The surprising result is that PAYGO-DB outperforms all other social security regime just like it did in the initial steady state. Critical analysis of the transition path has pointed out the reason behind its success. Table 4 reports steady state welfare comparison under di¤erent pension system. Appendix 4 explains how the social welfare is calculated for each of the pension systems. I report three di¤erent measure of steady state welfare. V r represents the welfare of the retiree and V w represents the welfare of the worker. Finally, V represents the aggregate social welfare which is a population weighted average of V r and V w . Comparing welfare between workers and the retirees across di¤erent pension systems reveal interesting di¤erences. First, retirees welfare is the same under PAYGO and FF in the initial steady state. They enjoy higher welfare under FF in the …nal steady state. Second, workers receive higher welfare under FF during the initial and also the …nal steady state. Third,social welfare is maximized under FF both in the initial as well as in the …nal steady state. Fourth, there appears to be a clear trade-o¤ between growth and welfare. The above results in terms of welfare are consistent with Karni and Zilcha(1989) , Feldstein(2005) and abel (2003) .So there is no need to provide any intuition about this result. What is interesting is that FF systems raise welfare but reduce savings compared to the PAYGO system. This indicates that when there is a work force growth and when the retirees work part time, a PAYGO system would be preferable on the savings and growth grounds. But on the welfare grounds, FF is still the winner
Comparison Between Initial and New Steady State
Welfare Comparison Under Various Pension Regimes
Volatility of the Economy under various Social Security Regimes
The volatility of the system depends on the speed of convergence of the system. Since population shock is a negative shock to the system, the existence of some risk sharing mechanism will allow the economy to converge slower and should also reduce the volatility of the system. Table 5 reports the speed of convergence of the economy under di¤erent social security regime. Without going into the analysis of individual variables, we see that PAYGO, o¤ering a better risk sharing mechanism, also helps the economy converge slower than any other arrangement. Private annuity market help the economy converge faster than any other system in general. This is re ‡ected in the volatility of the system. Table 6 reports the volatility of consumption, output and capital under various social security arrangements 8 . It appears that the economy the economy much more volatile under the private annuity market. FF-DB provides us with the least volatile economy. Bohn(1998) argues that a system that has the least risk sharing structure would be subject to most volatility. This is evident in our experiments as well. It is therefore not surprising to …nd that the volatility under PAYGO and FF are comparable because they have some risk sharing mechanism.
Conclusion
In this paper, a serious attempt has been undertaken to model lifecycle demographic uncertainty into a DSGE framework. An attempt has been made to use tools and experimental setup that are traditionally been used in the RBC literature. With more rigorous and realistic design of the social security, this setup can be used very e¤ectively without resorting to non-tractable large scale OLG models. The model however has generated some interesting analytical results, some of which clearly contradicts existing steady state based results, even some large scale modeling attempt with stationary population. The paper, however, has several limitations which has to be stated precisely. First, allowing retirees to work but not subjecting them to payroll tax is very unrealistic. One could get di¤erent results if the latter is allowed. Second, the calibration exercise plays an important role in deriving the results of the model. The calibration exercise is not entirely satisfactory because most of the target variables were not calibrated to match data exactly. But the most serious criticism of the paper is the nature of the experiments that has been undertaken. In case of DB, it is assumed that only the bene…t rate is constant while in the DC case, only the tax rate is assume to be constant. Neither of the assumptions are correct and they do not resemblance the reality. Although the existing literature follows my strategy, the correct experiment would to keep the total bene…t constant in the DB case and keep total tax revenue constant under the DC case. We can then have a common ground on which we can evaluate the e¢ cacy of each of the social security arrangements. Without such a design, what we have done is to work with notional DB and DC system and therefore, the policy implications of the above experiments have been undermined. In order to verify quantitative precision of the model predictions, one has to be more careful with the calibration strategy. If it is done, and if the conclusion of this exercise survives the test, then we have made signi…cant contribution to the debate over demographic uncertainty and its e¤ect on social security design and on the economy in general.
Appendix 1: Solving the Private Annuity model without government Retirees Problem
The retirees solve the following problem:
With 0 1: The …rst order condition with respect to C rjk look like:
Envelope condition:
Substituting equation(d) into the …rst order condition yields after some simpli…cation, the following Euler equation for C rjk t :
First order condition with respect to l rjk t yields:
The envelope condition:
Now at the optimum, the envelope condition also suggests:
Therefore, equating (d) and (f) and after some simpli…cation:
Finally, substituting the …rst order condition for l 
Now guess that:
where H rjk t is de…ned by equation (19) in the main text. Also guess that the value function V rjk t has the following form:
Plugging the guess for V rjk t into the bellman equation for the retiree, we get:
After substituting the …rst order condition for l rjk t and the Euler equation for C rjk t on the right hand side of the equation, we derive law of motion for r t :
Now substitute the value of W t l rjk t from (19) into the budget constraint of the retiree:
Substituting the guess of C rjk t into the above equation:
Now substitute the guess for C rjk t into the Euler equation for C rjk t and we get:
Substituting equation(p) into the above equation:
After further simpli…cation,:
Comparing equation (s) with (n) and matching coe¢ cients, we get:
Workers Problem
The worker solve the following problem:
First order condition with respect C wjk : Envelope conditions:
Also because of the risk neutrality assumption, there is another envelope condition which suggests:
Therefore substituting equation(j) and (d) into the …rst order condition and making some simpli…cation yields the following Euler equation for C wjk t :
The …rst order condition with respect to l wjk t yields:
Substituting the guess for v w t and v r t into the above equation and simplifying:
Where is de…ned in (32) . Substituting the value of w t and r t from our guess into the above equation and simplifying:
Now substitute the guess for C wjk t+1 and the value of W t l wjk t from (27) into the worker's …rst budget constraint:
where t+1 is de…ned in (27) . Also substitute the guess of C wjk t+1 and C w r jk t+1 into the Euler equation of (ai) and simplifying we get:
This is the law of motion for the MPC of the worker. Thus we have solved the entire system
The rest of the equations of the system are repeated below ln n t+1 = n ln n t + e 1t+1 , 0 < n < 1 (N)
Equations (a-r)contain the entire dynamics of the system and therefore will be used to solve model. Appendix 3: Steady state system of equations of the Private Annuity Model The steady state system of equations in terms of the scaled variables of the baseline model of appendix 2 can be written as follows
All the other models are solved and scaled and their steady state systems are derived in the similar manner.
Appendix 4: Welfare Calculations under alternative social security Arrangements From the guess of the value function from the Private annuity market, we calculated that
The guess for the value functions for the PAYGO and the FF systems are similar where the guess about the retiree is same as the private annuity case while the guess for the workers in case of the DC systems look like
Where w t still satis…es equation(d). In steady state equation (a), (c), (e) in terms of the scaled variables look like
Now in case of the DB systems, the calculations are as follows:
We can therefore take the steady state value of s C r ; s C w ; ; ; s W from table-2 along with other exogenous parameter from table-1 from appendix-15 and can calculate the indirect utility for the worker and the retiree under alternative systems which again is their welfare. For calculating the aggregate social welfare, we de…ne V , the aggregate social welfare as follows
Which using equation (6.b) can be written as
Where the last inequality uses the de…nition of t . In steady state equation(i) looks like
From equation (3) , in steady state, the value of is de…ned as
We can now calculate the value of from table1. This will allow us to calculate the aggregate social welfare V once we have calculated the value of V r and V w . Finally, it should be noted this since V t is a function of consumption and real wage, which is also measured is terms of consumption units, welfare is also expressed in terms of consumption units. 
Rate of Immigration
